Repositório RCAAP

The aim of this article is to discuss the teleological principle of living beings in Kant´s moral philosophy. What Kant calls On the Principle for Judging Intrinsic Purposiveness in Organized Beings is described at § 66 of Kritik der Urteilskraft (AA 05 376) as: an organized product of nature is one in which everything is a purpose and reciprocally also a means. In such a product nothing is gratuitous, purposeless, or to be attributed to a blind natural mechanism. I intend to show here that when Kant questions the idea of good will in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten , he appeals to the teleological principle of living beings to arrive at the conclusion that the idea of good will is not a chimera, a fantasy, namely, it is reasonable to believe in good will, i.e. it is reasonable to believe that there are moral actions done from duty and not merely done in conformity with duty. With the presupposition of the teleological principle, acting from duty, acting morally, will not be a chimera anymore, as there will be good reasons to believe in good will , which will be then produced by reason in its practical use, despite the fact that the existence of good will continues not proven in Kant´s view, because for him it is impossible to prove that we actually act morally (from duty) given that no one is able to know either his/her own intentions or the intentions of others (ignorance of our intentions).

This work comes from the finding that there is considerable debate in the academic study of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, which is organized around the discussion of the relevance and feasibility of exploring an ontology in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, or whether it might be appropriate and consistent point training and development of a critical procedure by the French philosopher. In this sense, the central objective of this paper is to examine, in detail, of which conceptual elements that mobilizes Deleuze in his reading of Kant would support the development of a critical device in a field of thought seems far from Kant's work and the philosophy of Deleuze. At first analyzes the criticism that Deleuze proposes the philosophy of Kant, in particular the doctrine of the faculties and, subsequently, is done using the shift operated by Deleuze on basic concepts of Kantian philosophy, especially on the reinterpretation of the concept transcendental.

This article presents some aspects of the relation between Nietzsche’s thought and Kant, considering in particular the relation between philosophy and morality. The focus is in particular Nietzsche's critique of Kant, particularly in view of the points presented by Nietzsche as what separates him from his predecessor.

Piero Giordanetti's book is a vigorous effort to overturn this negative view. In addition, he proposes a reconstruction of Kant's musical aesthetics by delving into his unpublished remarks generally known as Reflexionen. He also places Kantian musical aesthetics in its historical-theoretical context, which leads him to discuss the influence that Leonhard Euler and Pietro Verri, for example, may have had on Kant.

This paper has as central objective to scrutinize the work Metaphysical foundations of natural science, by Immanuel Kant. It is part of a broader project which investigates the conception of Nature of many philosophers along the history. This work should be related with the critical philosophy in general, specially the Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science and the Critique of Pure Reason.

I give two interpretations of the supreme rules of all syllogisms provided by Kant in his pre-critical essay “The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures”. One interpretation understands literally, i.e., grammatically, the expressions ‘positive syllogism’ and ‘negative syllogism’; the other interprets them non-literally, i.e., it interprets them logically.

It is nowadays a commonplace of Kant-interpretation that Kant's response to Hume in the Analogies of Experience is not strictly speaking a refutation of Hume but in fact only an extended critical response to Hume's skeptical accounts of object-identity and causation, that also accepts many of Hume's working assumptions. But this approach can significantly underestimate the extent to which Kant's conception of the representational mind is radically distinct from Hume's. In particular, Kant's conception of the human mind's innately-specified spontaneous actions as ultimate sources of the veridical representation of both logical and metaphysical necessity in the world of objective experience, if correct, entails a flat-out rejection of Hume's conception of the human mind's merely projectivist abilities and activities. This in turn entails that, to this extent, the Analogies contain not only a critical response to Hume, but also a flat-out refutation of Hume.

The purpose of this study is to examine as the theory of acquired character of Schopenhauer, exposed especially in Aforismi, can offer an answer to the question of Kant and Schopenhauer about freedom and necessity. Analyzed the context of the gestation of the concept of "nature" in Kant, alongside the issue of freedom in the third antinomy. From this, take the concept of the acquired character in Schopenhauer as a middle way between the intelligible character and the empirical character, that can make the world of phenomenon less determinated.

The essay describes the relationship between Kant’s Critique of Madness written in the 1760s and his Critique of Reason dating from the 1780s. It attempts to reconstruct the systematics of Kant’s so-called Critical Turn, starting with his Essay on the diseases of the head (1764) and his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766), through the First grounds of the difference of the regions in space (1768) and the Inaugural-Dissertation (1770) up to his Critique of pure Reason (1781/87). The essay points out the way in which Kant applies his psychological insights to philosophy. Via his theory of hallucination, he arrives at the insight that all knowledge is based on projections. Starting with this premise, he examines the objective and subjective basis of rational projection, i.e. apriori reason. Again, he relates the knowledge of projection to philosophy in his examination of projections in logical judgements based on Leibniz’ axioms. This leads him to the detection of three types of logical errors in logical judgement: amphibolia, paralogism, and antinomia. With the latter, his early theory of madness was integrated in philosophy. This essay points out some of the central ideas of my book, Wahn und Wahrheit. Kants Auseinandersetzung mit dem Irrationalen (Akademieverlag, Berlin 2007).

This paper shows the meaning of concept of human nature according to the nominal definitions and the characteristic elements of Kant´s work. The research gives some elements to decide the place and the status of the anthropology in Kantian sense.

This article aims to contribute, seeking subvention in some aspects of the thoughts of Kant and Freud, to a reflection on the notion of the civilization progress, in a moral sense, withdrawing from it the possibilities of construction and maintenance of civilizing achievements. Therefore an investigation on its respective conceptions of human nature, of humanity civilization progress, of progressive demonstration of human spirit, in synthesis, its philosophies of history. It will be achieved by pointing approaches, as well as theoretical divergences of both, which option is justified by the fact that they present discerned perspectives in relation to the indications, developments and outcomes of the relationship between sensibility and reason, which is manifested in what we call society, or more broadly, civilization.

The present paper begins by attempting to show what predicate "beautiful" means when used in synthetic a priori judgements of taste regarding the objets of nature, and lays out how Kant justifies the claims conveyed by those judgments. It then examines the meaning and the claims of the judgments of taste regarding beauty in objets of art, and finishes by focusing attention on judgments of the beauty of musical compositions.

Welcher ist der wirkliche Status der Sprache in der Philosophie Kants? Hat Kant über die Sprache einfach geschwiegen oder sogar die Reflexion über sie unterdrückt? Warum scheint die Sprache keinen Platz in der kritischen Philosophie zu haben? Einige dieser Fragen sind während Kants Leben erstmals gestellt worden und andere waren schon Thema der Diskussion im 19. Jahrhundert. Wie bekannt ist, haben Hamann und Herder die Schwächen einer sprachlosen Vernunft betont, was zu einer Tradition geführt hat, in welcher das kantische Schweigen über die Sprache einen Konsens erreicht hat.

O estudo de Laura Anna Macor, fruto de sua pesquisa doutoral junto ao Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de Padova (Itália) apresenta-se como rica reflexão sobre uma das noções mais caras ao debate filosófico, a noção de “destino” humano. Tendo a historiografia, a literatura e a exegese filosófica como suportes à sua tese, Macor apresenta, já no título da obra aqui resenhada, uma adjetivação provocante: O percurso pantanoso do destino humano: Friedrich Schiller do Iluminismo ao Criticismo.

“Todos nós ‘sabemos’ do ‘sistema kantiano’. Entretanto, todos nós duvidamos na hora de determinar seus alcances e limites. Onde começa e acaba o ‘sistema’? Quais são suas partes sem agregados? (PEREZ, 2008. p. 14)” Perez inicia o livro, Kant e o problema da significação, indagando-se pelo possibilidade, pela extensão e pelo limite da “obra kantiana” ser entendida como sistema. Se a resposta a pergunta for sim, tem que se definir o que caracteriza o sistema kantiano. Para o autor, o sistema kantiano é caracterizado pela presença sistemática da pergunta: como são possíveis as proposições sintéticas a priori? Na interpretação de Perez, a resposta da pergunta acima ilustrada também responde a questão: como é possível atribuir sentido e significado às proposições sintéticas a priori? Entretanto, surge o seguinte problema: se considerar que a filosofia kantiana é um sistema devido à presença da pergunta, como são possíveis as proposições sintéticas a priori, o sistema estaria limitado às três Críticas? Senão, está, qual é a unidade entre o período pré-crítico, crítico e os textos tardios?

This article aims to examine the concept of Kantian ethical state of nature focusing on the following points: 1) the characteristics inherent in human nature that provide or promote such condition, 2) the peculiarities of the Kantian concept of an ethical state of nature before the concept classic state of nature, and 3) the proposal Kantian to overcome of such a state under an ethical community, which shows a moral collective labor.

This essay examines the question of Aufklärung, which opens the Course of 1983, called "The government of self and others," given by Michel Foucault at the Collège de France. According to Foucault, the philosophical speech in the Occident has built a part of its identity in this issue of the government of self and others, which was in Kantian question about the Lights. For Foucault, the Aufklärung develops the following ideas: thinking about the "public" concept referred by Kant; defining modernity as the ethics of the present time; thinking also about the relations between government of self and government of others, going by an entire analysis of the relationship between obedience and absence of reasoning, private and public, until defining what is freedom of thinking.

The idea of responsibility is overshadowed in Kant’s practical philosophy by the concept of duty. The idea of responsibility is overshadowed in Kant’s practical philosophy by the concept of duty. Throughout the post-modern period, it has been yielding up its place to responsibility. This study emphasizes the character relative to the context, place and the philosophical concept of the term responsibility in Kant’s later works. It does so in order to rehabilitate, on the one hand, its statute as a normative principle of reflection on morality, and on the other, as personal action, normatively open to the multiple alternatives for action in the sphere of human freedom.

In the Cassirerian bibliography, it is usual to understand his philosophy of simbolic formas as a “broadening” of the critical (Kant or Neokantian) philosophy to a “philosophy of culture”. This understanding, however, is inadequate. The “philosophy of symbolic forms” has its historical and systematic origin in a reflection upon the situation of science in the second half of the 19th century. It is the new Faktum of science that which makes transcendental philosophy, from Cassirer’s point of view, adopt a new approach to the problem of objectivity.

The article aims to discuss the notion of conformity according to finality as a transcendental principle of the reflexive power of the judgment on Kant’s first and second introductions of the Critic of the Power of Judgment, presenting it as a regulative and hypothetical principle for the systematization of the empiric laws.