Repositório RCAAP

This text aims to set out Kantian pedagogical thought as a supplementary piece of his conception of reason. The process of appropriation of reason needs to involve as an essential means the discipline, i.e., that part of education which gets children fit to use their freedom in a communitarian context. With this approach, it analyzes the educational progress as a path which has to be carried out in six steps. Going this path through, the rational human being quits its animal feature, getting used to obey to rules of universal reach, in order to achieve finally a moral character, which is required to be able to act in a human community regulated by courtesy and right.

We´ll intended with article summarizing the main reasons for Nietzsche's critique of Kant in relation to the notion of nature and morality as anti-nature. To this end, the Nietzschean critique is headed by the attempt to reveal the Kantian strategy that reserved a place untouched for metaphysics and, thus, led to the consolidation of the old foundations of morality. Against Kant, Nietzsche presents a notion of nature as guided by a kind of necessity illogical that, being respected, would lead to the affirmation of the vital nature. The debate between the authors, therefore, leads to one of the central questions of the modern era and shows how Nietzsche sees Kant as a true emblem of modernity.

In the horizon of the Kantian theory of the reasoning problems and his auxiliary theory (transcendental philosophy), can the States law fundamental juridical problem in Rechtslehre be synthesized by the question: how are the States law a priori synthetic judgments possible? On the other hand, in the matter of logical-analytical problems resolution, it is possible to operate through the analysis and synthesis method. The objective of this article is to reconstruct the possibility problem and the applicability of the States law theory according to this procedure of discovery and exposition. In a wide context, the aim is to connect the Kantian Rechtslehre to the solubility theory of reasoning in general to make explicit the critical character of this late juridical work.

Zeljko Loparic nasceu no dia 3 de dezembro de 1939 na cidade de Cvetkovic, na Croácia. Fez o colegial na cidade de Zagreb. Durante sua adolescência aproximou-se aos textos de Santo Tomás, Platão e Kant. Estudou filologia na Universidade de Zagreb e filosofia na Bélgica, na Universidade Católica de Louvain. Na Croacia, nos últimos anos da década de 1950, num ambiente filosófico marxista-heideggeriano, Loparic se inclinou pelas línguas clássicas e modernas. Em Louvain, interessou-se pela filosofia da matemática. Na década de 1960 morou em várias cidades da Europa.

The aim of this paper is to discuss Loparic’s reading of the ethical implications of the Wittgensteinian notion of language-games. Contrary to his view that they lead to relativism and skepticism, I will argue that the so-called “Second Wittgenstein” give us the means to criticize cientificism and naturalism in Ethics and that they are not relativist. Moreover, I will show that Loparic’s comparative analysis between Heidegger and Wittgenstein is flawed precisely because the notion of language-games does not yield to skepticism.

In this article I reconstruct the transcendental analytics in the first half of the decade of 1770, and I interprete it as transcendental semantics. In a letter to Herz from 1772, Kant elaborates the critical project, while revising the Dissertation of 1770 and he hopes to write the Critique of pure reason in approximately three months. The solution of the problem that he has in mind by this time, is limited to the objectivity of intellectual representations.

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the State law Kantian theory exposed in Rechtslehre (1797), through an analytical-logical reading key, which contains as proof proceeding the analysis and synthesis method. This investigation corroborates with the interpretation that defends the criticality this late juridical text to an extent that the State law is connected to the critical plan of the a priori synthetic judgments in general enunciation.

My aim in this paper is to examine how, from a Kantian perspective, the model of the Second Analogy of Experience could be applied to the perception of objective successions and coexistences of musical sounds, that is to say, to the hearing of chords and melodic lines. I begin by showing how the reasoning of the Second Analogy can reasonably be transferred to this new realm of experience; I examine, then, some difficulties related to this proposed transference of the Kantian argument; and I conclude by raising and answering some objections that could be made against my proposal.

The aim of this paper is to critically examine Rawls’ discussions of the method of a moral theory spread through his book A Theory of Justice. First, Kant’s reasons for rejecting the attempt to employ in philosophy a method inspired in mathematics, respectively, in geometry are considered. This provides a basis for rejecting the interpretation given by Maria Carolina and Zeljko Loparic, according to which Rawls would have allegedly followed Kant’s indications, and applied methodological developments of the Greek geometry to the solution of philosophical problems. Second, a brief analysis of some passages in Rawls’ book is given from which it becomes clear that despite his references to several methodological guidelines his real inspiration comes from Chomsky’s linguistics. The aims and method of Chomsky’s linguistics is then discussed to show the parallelism between them and Rawls’ own statements on the aims and method of his moral theory. Finally, it is argued that the purported parallelism collapses because, among other things, the data of a philosophical moral theory are completely different in nature from the data in linguistics.

The present paper aims to discuss Kant’s critical solution for the possibility problem of the transcendental idea of freedom. The problem consists in the supposed incompatibility between that idea and the natural causality. Despite the impossibility of a dogmatic solution for the conflict, the philosopher proposes a critical solution. This critical solution frequently is interpreted as a attempt to make freedom compatible with natural causation. There are, however, some divergences about the form and the implications of that compatibility. I intend to defend that the compatibilism that result from Kant’s critical solution doesn’t assure the real possibility of freedom, but only its logical possibility.

In the Zeljko Loparic´s article "Kantian solution of the fundamental problem of religion" (2008), he connect the originality of the doctrine of radical evil to the anthropological inflection of practice Kantian philosophy, whose culminating reflection would be presented in the Doctrine of Virtue and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. However, the discussion that I intend to do, with the interpretation offered by Loparic on Kantian doctrine of radical evil, has a more restricted purpose. I intend to focus on the following problem: in the Kant’s moral philosophy, the question of whether the moral evil refers essentially to the particular maxims or to the man’s character involves the difficulty on the relationship among Gesinnung, fundamental maxim and particular maxims. This difficulty can give rise to the claim that the fundamental maxim can not be the focus to assert the moral quality of actions, since it indicates a general plan of the particular maxim, while the moral quality of actions seems to depend more on particular maxim rather than fundamental maxim. According to Loparic, Kant argues in Religion the thesis that predicates morally good and morally bad should be applied primarily to man, ie the person's character. Thus, the question arises: what exactly is the target of ascription our moral judgements? Now, we can’t judge directly the man’s character, that is to say, we do not say that a man is good or evil because of an isolated action. So, what is the base to state that a man is evil? It will also be necessary to discuss if what the Religion offers, or suggests to offer, represents an alternative view, or is consistent with what we have learned about the moral evaluation in the Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason. I defend that Religion represents an alternative view.

In this paper I try to show how transcendental logic can be interpreted in light of the distinction between apophantics and formal ontology. Despite the non-Kantian origin of these concepts, my contention is that they can reveal the scope of Kant’s argument regarding the distinction between formal and transcendental logic and the thesis that transcendental logic has a pure a priori content. While common approaches interpret this a priori content of transcendental logic as the content pure forms of aesthetics give, we stress that this content is the a priori concepts of object which are embedded in the logical form of judgments.

The difficulty some interpreters find to place Kant´s writings on Anthropology within his system is well known. There are those who understand the Anthropology as a transcendental science, those who think it is a mere non-systematic and empirical “science”, and even a rapsodic chaos of information on diverse and disconnected subjects; finally, there are also those who consider the Anthropology as the applied moral philosophy Kant had promised, either in the preface of the Groundwork, or in the Metaphysics of Morals. On the one hand, Kant had already referred the question for human nature to the Anthropology in the Critique of the pure reason. Nothing appears to be more natural, therefore, than considering the Anthropology as the science of human nature. On the other hand, the problem consists in determining whether and to what extent the critical philosophy can approach the concept of “human nature”. A good deal of difficulty comes from lack of clarity and unity with regard to its subject proper. For even if we accept that it must deal with human nature, it is not that clear in which sense human nature is to be understood from the point of view of “pragmatic anthropology”, nor how human being must be focused on in such an enquiry, whether empirically or not. My aim here is to explain in which sense pragmatic anthropology can be understood as science of human nature. I defend that this is possible out of a certain principle of analogy. Thus, in the first part I briefly mention some positions of the interpreters concerning the place and the status of the Anthropology in the critical system and identify a confusion sometimes is made between the place of the Anthropology within the system and its scientifically problematic status. In the second part, based upon Kant´s Lectures on Anthropology I argue that historically and conceptually Kant´s Anthropology endeavors to conciliate two different interests, namely, to criticize and reformulate the empirical psychology of the Wolfians and to observe and describe human being individually and collectivelly in order to offer a notion of human nature which the concepts and principles of its moral theory and its theory of the metaphysical knowledge can in concrete be applied to. In the third part, I defend that Anthropology considered as a cosmological knowledge reformulates the Humean project of an empirical science of human nature as a nearly–empirical science, since it involves as much observation and experience as well as application principles. My central thesis is here that the empirical scientific character of antropological knowledge is guaranteed by the application of the principle of analogy: what a human being knows intuitively from of himself as a set of first-order predicates functions as starting point for his reflection, out of which he is able to deduce consequences by analogy between himself and other human beings, as a set of second-order predicates he applies extensively to others. Thus, the Anthropology could appeal to observation and experience without being arbitrary: my knowledge of myself would be mediated by the knowledge of the others to the extent that I think myself in analogy with other beings that are given to me intuitively; conversely, my knowledge of the others would be mediated at the same time by the knowledge I have from myself, my body, as well as my mental and moral faculties. My knowledge of human being from the cosmopolitan point of view, as citizen of the world, then, would be thought and conceived of in analogy with my faculties and habits, with the moral, psychological structure and social politics of my world, with the uses and customs of my community. If this is not scientific knowledge in the strict sense (universal and necessary) as outlined in the first Critique, however, pragmatic antropological knowledge can be understood as a sound talk about humans, to the extent that on the basis of the principle of analogy a claim at universality and necessity is made which is pragmatically verifiable in action.

Kant has often been criticized for holding a very negative vision of women, according to which they are less rational and less morally valuable than men. I shall argue quite the opposite. I will show that, in spite of some minor pejorative comments, Kant held that women fit better the ideal of a moral person than men. This is due to some qualities of the female sex, mainly women’s capacity for self–control and the capacity for having moral emotions such as sympathy and compassion. Moreover, women show their master of emotions and passions when they are able to use their emotional sensitivity and self-control to master the feelings and passions of men.

Heiner Klemme, Doutor em Filosofia pela Philipps-Universität (Marburg), atualmente é professor do Departamento de Filosofia da Johannes Gutenberg Universität (Mainz), onde coordena os trabalhos em Filosofia Moderna e o Centro de Pesquisa em Kant. Klemme também é co-editor da Kant-Studien e Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte (Berlim - Nova York); membro do conselho Kant-Gesellschaft e. V. Bonn e membro do comitê científico da Studi Kantiani (Pisa, Roma). Possui quatro livros publicados, cerca de 63 resenhas e ensaios, além de artigos, editoriais e comentários. Ministrou palestras em diversos países, dentre os quais Bélgica, Japão, China, Irlanda, Itália, Noruega, EUA e Brasil. Seus projetos atuais versam sobre os limites da lei e da dignidade (Grundlagen und Grenzen von Recht und Würde. Ein Versuch über die Aktualität Kants); filosofia clássica alemã (Natur und Freiheit in der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie) e direitos humanos (Geschichte und Systematik der Menschenrechte). Em 2007 foi professor visitante na USP e na UNESP, quando ministrou o curso Filosofia Política de Kant - Moral e Direito na Perspectiva Histórica e Futura, apresentado neste número especial da Kant e-Prints, com tradução de Clélia Aparecida Martins.

Questões relativas aos fins de nosso agir encontram-se em três dimensões, a saber, a do querer, a do dever, e a do poder, e são propriamente limitadas umas às outras. Tomemos o tema de nosso curso, a filosofia política de Kant, perguntamo-nos como queremos viver uns com os outros em uma sociedade política, ou seja, perguntamos naturalmente por um fim que em princípio também precisamos poder alcançar. Logo, este fim não deve ser localizado fora de nossa realidade de vida determinada pelos princípios da lógica e pelas leis da natureza. Se não, ele seria uma mera ideia, uma teia do pensamento, uma quimera. Contudo, o querer não implica só um poder-querer factível. Se entendemos nossas questões normativamente, então igualmente questionamos se o que queremos também deveríamos querer: devemos viver como sujeitos políticos tanto quanto queremos viver com prazer? Esta questão soa num primeiro momento muito estranha. Mas, atendo-nos a ela com mais cuidado, faz sentido. Se avaliamos nosso querer factível por um parâmetro externo a ele, então desaparece a diferença entre o querer e o dever. A partir da perspectiva desse parâmetro considerado, julgamos se nosso querer é correto ou falso, bom ou ruim.

Alexandre Hahn, Doutor em Filosofia pela Unicamp, é membro do GT da Anpof "Criticismo e Semântica" e do Grupo de Pesquisa da CNPq. Atualmente é professor no Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Pará. Fez estágio do doutorado em Berlim - Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, sob a orientação do Professor Dr. Volker Gerhardt. Neste número especial da Kant e-Prints, Hahn nos brinda com a tradução do ensaio Das diferentes raças humanas, de Immanuel Kant, publicado em 1775 e 1777 e ainda inédito no Brasil. Antecedendo a tradução, Hahn elabora um curto, mas esclarecedor, estudo sobre o escrito kantiano.

O ensaio Das diferentes raças humanas, publicado em 1775, foi inicialmente concebido como um anúncio das preleções (Vorlesungen) de geografia física, que seriam ofertadas por Kant no semestre de verão daquele ano na Universidade de Königsberg. De acordo com Daniel Heinrich Arnoldt (1706-1775), era costume em Königsberg, durante o século XVIII, que apenas os cursos dos professores (titulares ou associados) fossem anunciados no catálogo oficial de preleções (Catalogus lectionum), impresso em latim. Os docentes privados (Privatdozenten) deviam anunciar suas preleções no quadro de avisos (schwarzes Brett) da universidade, ou podiam ainda divulgá-las mediante a distribuição de breves prospectos ou programas, que delineassem o teor das preleções que pretendiam oferecer naquele semestre. Kant fez uso desse recurso de redigir pequenos ensaios acadêmicos, como forma de divulgação de suas preleções, em sete ocasiões: nos semestres de verão de 1756, 1757 e 1758, nos semestres de inverno de 1759/1760, 1762/1763 e 1765/1766, e, por último, no semestre de verão de 1775.

No reino animal, a divisão natural em gêneros [Gattungen] e espécies [Arten] fundase na lei comunitária da reprodução [Fortpflanzung], e a unidade dos gêneros não é outra coisa que a unidade da força procriante [zeugenden Kraft], que vale universalmente para uma certa diversidade de animais. Por isto, a regra | buffoniana, a qual afirma que animais que procriam [erzeugen] conjuntamente crias [Junge] férteis pertencem a um único e mesmo gênero físico (não importa a diferença de feição [Gestalt] que os mesmos possam ter), na verdade, tem de ser vista apenas como a definição de um gênero natural de animais em geral, em contraste a todos os gêneros escolares dos mesmos. A divisão escolar se baseia em classes e divide por semelhança.

Em sua maturidade intelectual, Michel Foucault, em artigos e entrevistas, insiste na oposição entre Descartes e Kant. Esta oposição teria motivações históricas e filosóficas. Descartes, quando perguntado sobre o “si”, responde que é um sujeito único, a-histórico universal. O “Si” cartesiano é uma substância que não é descrita por suas circunstâncias; pelo contrário, o “eu” é uma condição do conhecimento e das representações. Kant, por outro lado, teria levantado uma problematização de ordem completamente distinta: "... A questão que Kant levanta é diferente: Quem somos, neste preciso momento na história? Que a questão de analise é, ao mesmo tempo, nós mesmos e nossa situação no momento presente. “(FOUCAULT, 1994, vol. IV, p. 231-2). Kant é referência às idéias de Foucault sobre a autonomia, com reflexões sobre a questão da liberdade (ou seja, a luta contra a dominação), da verdade dita, da auto-construção, o que simplesmente se confirma lendo a “hermenêutica do sujeito” e do “Governo de si e dos outros”, bem como em seus textos e artigos. Nosso interesse, no entanto, vem da oposição de Descartes-Kant que é exposta em “As palavras e as coisas”. No livro, Foucault descreve em detalhes o processo de transição da idade clássica para a idade moderna, períodos em que Descartes e Kant tiveram papel central, respectivamente. Nossa hipótese é que Kant (apesar das críticas dirigidas a ele por Foucault) contribuiu para a modificação do papel importante do tema racionalismo como uma introdução incondicional em sua filosofia crítica, lugar para finitude, e com este golpe, nos leva a uma nova visão do homem contemporâneo, no sentido da palavra. Essa idéia de homem, por outro lado, influencia e fornece as condições de possibilidade para uma auto-elaboração dos temas, como a tecnologia de si, a partir do século 18, com reflexos nos dias atuais.