Repositório RCAAP

Informação Editorial

Foreword : Consistency, Contradiction, and Consequence

In this paper I sketch some lines of response to Mark Colyvan’s (2008) indispensability  arguments for the existence of inconsistent objects, being mainly concerned with the indispens ability of inconsistent mathematical entities. My response will draw heavily on Jody Azzouni’s (2004) deflationary nominalism.

This paper deals about two types of political rights – the right to vote and the right of parliamentary representation – during the irst republican decades in Brazil (1889-1937). Based on the study of the electoral laws, the irst two Republican Constitutions, the analysis of parliamentary annals and contemporary dictionaries, among other sources, we intend to discuss the political citizenship in general, as well as to compare the political participation during the two distinct periods of the Brazilian Republic. It is important to stress that in the second period (1930-1937) was created the corporative representation, which led us to relect on its role in broadening political citizenship. The article also involves a dialogue withthe relections around the concept of citizenship and its applications over Brazilianreality.

In this paper we intend to outline an introduction to Situation Theory as an approach to the liar paradoxes. This idea was first presented by the work of Barwise and Etchemendy (in their (1987)). First (section 1) we introduce the paradoxes in their most appealing and important versions. Second (section 2) we show that non-classical approaches on the problem usually get puzzled by the revenge problem on one side and loss of expressive power on the other side. Last (sections 3 and 4), we present Situation Theory and try to show how it is capable of solving the old paradoxes and blocking revenge. The price we pay on this view is universality, since it would allow a new revenge situated liar. We don’t intend to address the problem of universality here, but we try at least to motivate the reader to make sense of this theory.

Liar-like paradoxes are typically arguments that, by using very intuitive resources of natural language, end up in contradiction. Consistent solutions to those paradoxes usually have difficulties either because they restrict the expressive power of the language, or else because they fall prey to extended versions of the paradox. Dialetheists, like Graham Priest, propose that we should take the Liar at face value and accept the contradictory conclusion as true. A logical treatment of such contradictions is also put forward, with the Logic of Paradox (LP), which should account for the manifestations of the Liar. In this paper we shall argue that such a formal approach, as advanced by Priest, is unsatisfactory. In order to make contradictions acceptable, Priest has to distinguish between two kinds of contradictions, internal and external, corresponding, respectively, to the conclusions of the simple and of the extended Liar. Given that, we argue that while the natural interpretation of LP was intended to account for true and false sentences, dealing with internal contradictions, it lacks the resources to tame external contradictions. Also, the negation sign of LP is unable to represent internal contradictions adequately, precisely because of its allowance of sentences that may be true and false. As a result, the formal account suffers from severe limitations, which make it unable to represent the contradiction obtained in the conclusion of each of the paradoxes.

In different papers, Carnielli, W. & Rodrigues, A. (2012), Carnielli, W. Coniglio, M. & Rodrigues, A. (2017) and Rodrigues & Carnielli, (2016) present two logics motivated by the idea of capturing contradictions as conflicting evidence. The first logic is called BLE (the Basic Logic of Evidence) and the second—that is a conservative extension of BLE—is named LETJ (the Logic of Evidence and Truth). Roughly, BLE and LETJ are two non-classical (paraconsistent and paracomplete) logics in which the Laws of Explosion (EXP) and Excluded Middle (PEM) are not admissible. LETJ is built on top of BLE. Moreover, LETJ is a Logic of Formal Inconsistency (an LFI). This means that there is an operator that, roughly speaking, identifies a formula as having classical behavior. Both systems are motivated by the idea that there are different conditions for accepting or rejecting a sentence of our natural language. So, there are some special introduction and elimination rules in the theory that are capturing different conditions of use. Rodrigues & Carnielli’s paper has an interesting and challenging idea. According to them, BLE and LETJ are incompatible with dialetheia. It seems to show that these paraconsistent logics cannot be interpreted using truth-conditions that allow true contradictions. In short, BLE and LETJ talk about conflicting evidence avoiding to talk about gluts. I am going to argue against this point of view. Basically, I will firstly offer a new interpretation of BLE and LETJ that is compatible with dialetheia. The background of my position is to reject the one canonical interpretation thesis: the idea according to which a logical system has one standard interpretation. Then, I will secondly show that there is no logical basis to fix that Rodrigues & Carnielli’s interpretation is the canonical way to establish the content of logical notions of BLE and LETJ . Furthermore, the system LETJ captures inside classical logic. Then, I am also going to use this technical result to offer some further doubts about the one canonical interpretation thesis.

In the field of logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs), the notion of “consistency” is frequently too broad to draw decisive conclusions with respect to the validity of many theses involving the consistency connective. In this paper, we consider the matter of the axiom (cc)0—i.e., the schema ◦ ◦ϕ—by considering its interpretation in contexts in which “consistency” is understood as a type of verifiability. This paper suggests that such an interpretation is implicit in two extracanonical LFIs—Sören Halldén’s nonsense-logic C and Graham Priest’s cointuitionistic logic daC—drawing some interesting conclusions concerning the status of (cc)0. Initially, we discuss Halldén’s skepticism of this axiom and provide a plausible counterexample to its validity. We then discuss the interpretation of the operator in Priest’s daC and show the equivalence of (cc)0 to the intuitionistic principle of testability. These observations suggest that it may be fruitful for members of the LFI community to look outside the canon for evidence concerning the adoption of principles like (cc)0.

Several logical puzzles, riddles and problems are defined based on the notion of games in informative contexts. Hintikka argues that epistemology or the theory of knowledge must be considered from the notion of information. So, knowledge cannot just be based on the notions of belief and justification. The present proposal will focus on the logical structure of information, and not only on the quantification of information as suggested by Claude A. Shannon (1916-2001) (Shannon 1948). In many cases, the information bits, although seemingly or factually contradictory, are quite relevant. The paraconsistent systems of logic offer a formalization of reasoning that can support certain contradictions. The well-known “Bar-Hillel–Carnap Paradox” (Bar-Hillel, 1964) causes embarrassment when it concludes that the informational content of a contradiction would be maximum, opposing the traditional notion that the semantic information must be true, and that contradictions are necessarily false.

In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ￢A) both A and ￢A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues’s interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality.

In this paper I’ll explore the relation between ω-inconsistency and plain inconsistency, in the context of theories that intend to capture semantic concepts. In particular, I’ll focus on two very well known inconsistent but non-trivial theories of truth: LP and STTT. Both have the interesting feature of being able to handle semantic and arithmetic concepts, maintaining the standard model. However, it can be easily shown that both theories are ω- inconsistent. Although usually a theory of truth is generally expected to be ω-consistent, all conceptual concerns don’t apply to inconsistent theories. Finally, I’ll explore if it’s possible to have an inconsistent, butω-consistent theory of truth, restricting my analysis to substructural theories.

In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language involves fully specifying its inferential characteristics within the logic. To do this, we examine a recent proposal by Berto (2014) for a paraconsistent rejection, which — according to him — avoids paradox, even when introduced into a language that contains self-reference and a transparent truth predicate. We will show that this proposal is inadequate because it is too incomplete. We argue that the reason it avoids trouble is that the inferential characteristics of the new operator are left (mostly) unspecified, exporting the task of specifying them to metaphysicians. Additionally, we show that when completing this proposal with some plausible rules for the rejection operator, paradoxes do arise. Finally, we draw some more general implications from the study of this example.

No summary/description provided

Resenha de: SINGER, André. O lulismo em crise: um quebra-cabeça do período Dilma (2011-2016). São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2018.

This paper investigates the presence of analogies and metaphors on chapters of Modern Physics in textbooks indicated by the Guia de Livros Didáticos – PNLD 2018. Based on the most current language studies, there is an attempt to establish a conceptual distinction between these two figures of speech in order to a better use on Physics Education. The content analysis proposed by Bardin (2002) is used for data collection and registration and an adapted version of classification created by Curtis and Reigeluth (1984) is used for the classification of the occurrences. The numerical and qualitative data show the opposite characteristics between analogies and metaphors. Both compare familiar or already known information (vehicle) to new information (target), but the analogy does that with things that belong to the same domains while the metaphor does that with things that belong to different ones. Analogies is a useful tool to compare similarities and differences, which is very important to teaching concepts of Modern Physics. On the other hand, metaphors may make comparisons through concrete to abstract concepts, however this is done on a simplest form, hence, it requires more attention by authors of textbooks and teachers who use them.

The aim of this article is to argue that a temporal asymmetry may be established  within the framework of quantum field theory, independently of any violation of CP, and  thereby T, in weak interactions, and independently of the property of time reversal invariance  that its dynamical equations instantiate. Particularly, I shall argue that the temporal asymmetry  can be stemmed from assessing the links between the proper group of symmetries of the  theory and the ontology of the theory: arguments applied to establish which elements and  magnitudes remain invariants under group transformations can also be used to establish a  temporal asymmetry.

This article intends to realize a general analysis about the productions of work’s historiography in Santa Catarina State. It goes through the different ways of comprehension of History’s workers and does a deep examination about the productions realized in the last 12 years in the state. I have done a shortly presentation about the analyzed researches, with thematic groups, intending to have a better vision of the realized boarding.

This text is the result of a study that investigated the aspects of daily life in the city of Alfenas during the First Republic. The investigation was based on the requests sent to the city’s public power by its citizens, in order to understand some of the major problems affecting the daily life of its population and how it faced them. Thus, the objective of the research is to analyze how such requests can be interpreted as a tool of political action or citizenship through which the citizens who signed them looked forward to engaging the municipal government in the solution of problems of public interest.

The article present a survey of research involving geometry contents from the Historical-Cultural perspective, seeking to understand how they organize of geometric knowledge and to identify if they present a discussion about the logical-historical movement of the concept approached. When doing the readings we organized an investigation characterizing the researches regarding the focus of approach. We carried out a qualitative bibliographical survey that investigated 16 dissertations and 6 theses between the years of 2006 and 2017. We found that most approach geometric concepts with students of basic education, those involving document analysis and conceptual discussion present proposals for the teaching of geometry. Research on formation of teacher indicates that actions involving activity theory and the logical-historical movement of geometric concepts contribute to the appropriation of concepts and to teaching activities. We defend the need for other researches so that we can propose actions involving the teaching of geometry with an approach based on the Historical-Cultural perspective and the logical-historical movement.

Adoption as a social practice has been permeated by beliefs, values and behavioral patterns, among which racial prejudice occupies central stage, as a factor hindering the very selection process. The choice of this topic for the present study derives from the need to discuss inter-racial adoption because, although the issue of racial discrimination has been widely discussed both at national and international levels, the specific problematic of adoption in this context is still new and underexplored by professionals in the Human Sciences, for example, Social Assistants. In addition, very few authors have busied themselves with the issue. Hence the emergence and exploration of the topic in this article.